

Influence Processes

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Interpersonal Attraction and Social Influence

Personally attractive individuals often have a remarkable ability to influence others.

Delilah, an early spy for the Philistines, was assigned to uncover the secret of Samson's strength. After much nagging she finally succeeded in learning Samson's secret and depriving him of his strength. The Bible's terse language reveals little of Delilah's technique (other than continual harassment), yet we may safely assume the presence of attraction and social influence.

When most Russians looked at Rasputin they saw a physically repulsive peasant. But Tsar Nicholas II and his Tsarina did not see the flaws in Rasputin which to others were as obvious as his outstanding odor. The Romanoffs insisted that Rasputin was personally attractive, and proved their devotion to him by acceding to all his requests. They even allowed Rasputin to control Russian policy, in spite of the outraged opposition of Russian citizens.

The preceding examples suggest that interpersonal attraction and social influence are sometimes intimately related. In this chapter we will explore the relationships between interpersonal attraction and social influence. In the first section, we will review the antecedents of interpersonal attraction. In the second section we will review the antecedents of social influence. Finally, in the third section, we will speculate about the relationship between these variables.

Antecedents of Interpersonal Attraction

Definitions

This chapter will focus on two forms of attraction: liking and romantic love. *Liking* has been defined by a number of researchers (e.g., Newcomb, 1961; Homans, 1950); most definitions agree that liking is one person's positive attitude toward another, evidenced by

the person's tendency to approach and interact with the other. Unusually intense liking between two persons is sometimes designated *companionate love*.

Researchers have tried a number of techniques to detect how much people like one another. In 1884, Francis Galton became convinced that metaphorical expressions often mirror physical reality. He proceeded to investigate "the inclination of one person toward another" (Webb et al., 1966, p. 151). On the basis of his observations of people seated next to each other at dinner, Galton concluded that the more the dinner partners were attracted to one another, the more they leaned toward one another. Galton evidently believed that insults could be discreetly traded in an upright position, but that sweeter words might best be spoken at an angle of less than 90°.

How close one stands to another, how much his pupils dilate when gazing at the other, how often he looks into the other's eyes, whether he chooses the other as a work partner, and his self-reports have all been used to assess how he feels about the other. (See Webb et al., 1966, for an intriguing description of the wide variety of unobtrusive techniques which have been used to determine how people feel about one another.)

Researchers have spent little time defining or investigating *romantic love*. Most theorists have simply assumed that love is simply very intense liking. A few researchers have suspected that love may be a unique emotional state. For example, Schachter (1964) might argue that a person is "in love" only if (1) he is in a physiologically aroused state when contemplating the loved one, and (2) he labels his feelings as "love."

Reinforcement Theories

The principle which is most often cited to explain interpersonal attraction is the *principle of reinforcement*. This principle states that people learn to like those who reward them and to dislike those who punish them. Several theorists have elaborated upon the relationship between reinforcement and interpersonal attraction. For example, Homans (1961) proposes that how much we like others depends entirely on how often and how much they reward us. He observes,

A man's esteem depends upon the relative rarity of the services he provides . . . If he has capacities of heart, mind, skill, experience, or even strength that they do not have, and he uses these capacities to reward others, he will get esteem from them. But if his capacities are of a kind that they also possess, or if these capacities are widely available in the group, he will not get much esteem even if he uses them in such a way as to reward others (p. 150).

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The open secret of human exchange is to give the other man behavior that is more valuable to him than it is costly to you and to get from him behavior that is more valuable to you than it is costly to him (p. 62).

Byrne, London, and Reeves (1968) propose that there is an exact correspondence between reinforcement and attraction. They state: "Attraction toward X is a positive linear function of the proportion of positive reinforcements received from X or expected from X."

Other reinforcement theories have been proposed by Thibaut and Kelly (1959); Lott and Lott (1961); and Blau (1967).

All theorists agree that we like those who reward us. Unfortunately, as Berscheid and Walster (1969) lament:

While it is generally accepted that "we will like those who reward us and dislike those who punish us," we must note that this statement does not, to any great extent, increase predictability in the area of interpersonal attraction. We have no equation which will permit us to add up all the reward a stimulus person will provide and balance them against the punishment which he will inflict and thus arrive at a total reward index which will tell us how much others will like him: A multitude of things may be rewarding or punishing to any individual at a given time. In addition, it is often the case that "one man's meat is another man's poison" individuals differ in what they find to be rewarding or punishing (p. 31).

Since it is impossible to calculate exactly what each individual will find rewarding at each point in time, researchers in interpersonal attraction have chosen a simpler strategy. They have concentrated on pinpointing reinforcers which are rewarding to most people most of the time. Such universally valued reinforcers are labeled *transituational reinforcers*.

A reinforcer can be universally valued for two reasons: (1) Everyone is deprived of that specific reward nearly all the time. For example, in an overpopulated world, habitually hungry people may come to value food under a wide variety of conditions. (2) The reinforcer is capable of reducing a wide variety of needs. For example, money properly spent can be used to relieve hunger, boredom, thirst, etc. In the following section we will review three of the rewards which have been found to be potent transituational reinforcers.

ANXIETY REDUCTION

When individuals are anxious, frightened, lonely, or unsure of themselves, the presence of others is particularly reinforcing. Schachter (1959) demonstrated that the cowardly crave company. Schachter invited college girls to participate in an experiment. After arriving at the experiment, some girls made the alarming discovery

that the experiment involved extremely painful electric shocks. Other girls made the reassuring discovery that although they would be exposed to electric shock in the course of the experiment, the intensities involved were so very low that the "shocks" could best be described as mild tickles.

Once the girls had been frightened or calmed, Schachter then gave all of the girls an opportunity to affiliate with others. They were told that they could wait for the experiment to begin either in a private cubicle or in a cubicle shared with other girls. Schachter found that frightened girls were most inclined to seek the company of others. Sixty-three percent of the very frightened girls chose to wait with others: only 33 percent of the calm girls chose to affiliate. Additional support for this hypothesis comes from Gerard and Rabbie (1961); Sarnoff and Zimbardo (1961); Zimbardo and Formica (1963); and Darley and Aronson (1966).

Why do people seek company when they are frightened? Schachter examined several alternative explanations of this behavior: (1) *Escape*. When one is reluctantly trapped in a frightening situation he may seek company in the hope that others will be able to figure out a way to avert the cause of fright. (2) *Cognitive Clarity*. Volunteering for an experiment and then discovering that you will be severely shocked is a once in a lifetime experience. Individuals in this ambiguous setting may seek company in the hope of gaining a better understanding of this unsettling event. (3) *Indirect Anxiety Reduction*. Individuals may seek company in order to take their minds off the forthcoming shock. (4) *Direct Anxiety Reduction*. Frightened subjects may hope that their fellow students will give them emotional support. (5) *Self-Evaluation*. When individuals are placed in confusing situations they generally worry about whether or not their reactions are "normal." High-anxiety subjects undoubtedly experience a variety of conflicting emotions when they discover they are about to be shocked. They may feel frightened, curious, angry, timid, etc. Very frightened girls may seek out company in the hope of receiving information which will enable them to better label and identify their own ambivalent feelings.

On the basis of subsequent research, Schachter concluded that frightened individuals choose to associate with others for two reasons: they hope to receive direct anxiety reduction (reassurance) and they hope to receive information which will allow them to evaluate the normality of their feelings.

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company when they are frightened is also available. According to Bovard (1959), both physical and psychological stress produce dramatic physiological changes. They both produce a pituitary-adrenal response which stimulates carbohydrate metabolism and protein breakdown. Bovard argues that this pituitary-adrenal response is maladaptive; it diminishes the individual's chances of coping with the stressful situation. However, this maladaptive response can be dampened in a very simple way; the individual can seek out the company of a companion. Research has documented that the presence of a comrade will markedly reduce the physiological disturbance of a stressed individual, and thus increase his chances of survival. Individuals should quickly learn that when they are frightened, they will be better able to handle difficult situations (both physically and psychologically) if they surround themselves with agreeable companions.

ADMIRATION

As Homans (1961) points out, social approval is the epitome of a transituational reinforcer. Individuals value the esteem of others highly and will generally exert a great deal of effort to attain this reward.

When one has been deprived of affection, the approval of others becomes especially reinforcing. A number of investigators have demonstrated that deprived individuals are especially responsive to social approval (e.g., Stevenson and Odum, 1962). Of course, the converse is also true: deprived individuals become unusually frustrated when they seek social approval and are rejected.

The principle that deprived individuals react to rewards and punishments with unusual strength, suggests that the social relations of unpopular individuals might be especially volatile. According to the preceding reasoning, unpopular adolescents might be especially susceptible to falling in love with any suitor who professes his own infatuation. Scarce resources are valuable and, to the unpopular youth, an admiring date is rare and valuable indeed. But woe to the suitor who is caught feigning interest. The insecure adolescent who is desperately seeking admiration will hate the date who humiliates her.

Support for the proposition that individuals with low self-esteem (those who receive little social approbation) will be especially appreciative of dates who proffer affection and especially resentful of those who do not, comes from Dittes (1959), Walster (1965), and Jacobs, Walster, and Berscheid (1970).

CONFIRMATION THAT OUR BELIEFS ARE CORRECT

Festinger (1954) argues that people discover early in life that holding incorrect opinions can be punishing or even fatal. Thus, they soon develop a drive to evaluate (and evidently to affirm) the correctness of their opinions and beliefs. When one discovers that someone else agrees with his attitudes and opinions, he is given support for the notion that his opinions are correct. This presumably is a pleasant experience. When another disagrees with his opinions, it is a punishing experience. Byrne (1961) observes "disagreement raises the unpleasant possibility that we are, to some degree, stupid, uninformed, immoral, or insane" (p. 713).

Byrne and his associates have demonstrated in numerous experiments that when one discovers that another shares his opinions, he increases his liking for the other. Evidently everyone behaves a bit like the Disraeli character who unashamedly affirmed: "My idea of an agreeable person . . . is a person who agrees with me."

Byrne, Ervin, and Lamberth (1970) found that in natural settings, individuals quickly discover whether or not potential dates share their attitudes, and, on that basis, decide whether or not to be friends. The authors selected two types of couples to go out on brief coffee dates. Half of the couples selected were similar in personality and attitudes. Half were dissimilar in personality. All of the couples went out for coffee. Even in the brief amount of time they were allowed for conversation, students soon detected whether or not they had similar attitudes. Similar couples became much more attached to one another in the course of conversation than did dissimilar couples. Similar couples liked each other better, stood closer to one another, judged each other to be more physically attractive, and more often wished to continue dating one another than did dissimilar couples.

There are obviously many other transituational reinforcers besides those we have detailed. Many of these are elucidated in Berscheid and Walster (1969).

In summary, research makes it clear that we will like those who provide us with rewards, who cooperate with us in our attempts to attain rewards for ourselves, or who are physically present when we are rewarded. The complement of this observation is also true: we will dislike those who punish us, who frustrate our attempts to obtain rewards, or who are present when we are punished (Dollard et al., 1939; Berkowitz, 1962).

The Exchange Theories

Thus far, we have been writing as if individuals are most content when attaining as many rewards as possible at the least possible cost

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to themselves. We will see that this perspective is too limited. Even if one assumes that a man is completely selfish, one must acknowledge that it is not in any man's self-interest to remain oblivious to the needs and feelings of others. When everyone is competing for the same rewards, a man who refuses to compromise and tries to hoard all the valuables would not be expected to survive for long. The necessity for accommodating oneself to others' needs is so universal that every culture has institutionalized a system for equitably apportioning scarce resources among its members (Levi-Strauss in de Jong, 1952). Of course, the definition of what is equitable varies enormously among cultures.

In spite of the fact that different societies have established surprisingly different procedures for apportioning their resources, a general principle has been found useful in characterizing what is equitable. Homans (1961), Blau (1967), Adams (1965), and Walster, Berschied, and Walster (1970) have contributed to this formulation.

These theorists define an equitable relationship as one in which everyone receives what he "deserves"—or in the terms of equity theory—when everyone receives outcomes appropriate to his inputs. If anyone receives more rewards or fewer rewards than he deserves, the relationship is inequitable and uncomfortable for its participants.

Participants in inequitable relationships have been found to handle their discomfort in one of two different ways: (1) They try to correct the inequitable conditions. For example, an uneasy boss may encourage his underpaid and overworked secretary to take a day off. Or, the exploited secretary may herself demand time and a half for overtime. (2) They do nothing to correct the inequity, but they attempt to justify it. Human beings seem to be surprisingly adept at distorting reality in order to reassure themselves that the world is as they wish it to be. Research indicates that both the exploiter and the exploited often respond to inequities by denying they exist.

The statement that *exploiters* often justify their exploitation is not too surprising to us. It is a common observation that people easily rationalize the harm they do to others. Even those who commit atrocities are able to devise complex rationalizations for their behavior. Several are especially popular: denigration of the victim, minimization of his suffering, and denial of one's responsibility for his suffering.

That harmdoers will often denigrate their victims was evident to the ancients. Tacitus observed, "It is a principle of human nature to hate those you have injured." Experimental support for this insight comes from Davis and Jones (1960), Glass (1964), and Walster and Prestholdt (1966). According to Sykes and Matza (1957) juvenile delinquents often defend their victimization of others by arguing

that those they rob or "mug" are homosexuals or bums. In tormenting others, the delinquents claim to be the restorers of justice rather than harmdoers.

Sykes and Matza (1957), and Brock and Buss (1962) found that harmdoers consistently underestimate how seriously they have injured another. Brock and Buss found that college students who administered electric shocks to other students generally denied that their fellow students suffered or that the shocks they administered really hurt. In daily life, denial of responsibility seems to be a favorite strategy of those who are accused of exploiting others. That harmdoers will often deny their responsibility for harmdoing has been documented by Sykes and Matza (1957) and by Brock and Buss (1962, 1964).

Victims also sometimes justify inequitable relations. Generally, exploited individuals are persistent in their attempts to secure restitution. Sometimes, however, the victim finds that he is not able to secure it. The impotent victim is then left with two options: he can acknowledge that he is exploited and that he is too weak to do anything about it; or, he can justify his exploitation. Often, victimized individuals find it less upsetting to distort reality and justify their victimization than to acknowledge that the world is unjust and they are too impotent to elicit fair treatment (Lerner and Matthews, 1967).

Victimized individuals have been found to justify their own exploitation in several ways. Victims sometimes console themselves by imagining that their exploitation has brought compensating benefits.

Sometimes they try to convince themselves that the exploiter actually deserves his excessive outcomes. Recent data document that the exploited engage in such systematic distortions. Jecker and Landy (1969), Walster and Prestholdt (1966), and Hastorf and Regan (personal communication) pressured students into performing a difficult favor for an unworthy recipient. They found that the abashed favor-doer would try to justify his misguided philanthropy by convincing himself that the recipient was especially needy or worthy.

Reformers who work to alleviate social injustices are often at a loss when they discover that the exploited are themselves sometimes vehement defenders of the status quo. Integrationists encounter "Uncle Toms," who defend white supremacy. Women's Liberation groups find themselves facing housewives who angrily defend the inferior status of women. Reformers have more sympathy for such

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"Uncle Toms" and psychological underpinnings, but has degraded to deny position.

In summary, we can see that those who reward others are like those who reward themselves. However, the preceding research finds that what is most satisfying. One way of liking for the man exploited is not merely in the fairness of the illusions by denying benefits conferred on us to predict how the meaning of these benefits.

Balance theorists have shown that an important determinant of liking is, however, that the subject supplements his knowledge of the other's understanding of the other's mind. Individual differences in their experiences, their attitudes, and their values that enables them to understand others.

Two balance theories of interpersonal attraction are the dissonance theory of

HEIDER'S BALANCE THEORY

Heider's (1958) balance theory of interpersonal attraction that exist between a person and two other persons, X and Y. Two kinds of relationships—

are emphasized: *Sentiment relationships*—likes, loves, or value relationships, which we have labeled as *sentiment*, or *-L*.

Unit relationships may

"Uncle Toms" and "Doris Days" when they understand the psychological underpinnings of such reactions. When one is treated inequitably, but has no hope of altering his situation, it is often less degrading to deny reality than to face up to one's humiliating position.

In summary, we can stand by our earlier statement that individuals like those who reward them and dislike those who punish them. However, the preceding section alerts us to the fact that a man often finds that what is materially rewarding is not always spiritually satisfying. One way he can handle his dilemma is to decrease his liking for the man he has exploited. Similarly, the man who is exploited is not merely deprived of material benefits—his confidence in the fairness of the world is shaken. He may choose to maintain his illusions by denying he is exploited. A knowledge of the material benefits conferred on an individual is not, in itself, enough to enable us to predict how he will respond. A knowledge of the symbolic meaning of these benefits is also necessary.

The Balance Theories

Balance theorists would certainly agree that reinforcement is an important determinant of interpersonal attraction. They would point out, however, that one can best predict human behavior if he supplements his knowledge of reinforcement principles with an understanding of the way that information is organized and stored in the mind. Individuals do not separately evaluate and store each of their experiences, they generalize or develop a consistent picture, of others that enables them to react to others in reliable ways.

Two balance theories—the balance theory of Heider and cognitive dissonance theory of Festinger—have most intrigued researchers.

HEIDER'S BALANCE THEORY

Heider's (1958) balance theory deals with the kinds of relationships that exist between a person, *P*, another, *O*, and an object of mutual concern, *X*. Two kinds of relations—sentiment relations and unit relations—are emphasized.

Sentiment relations may be either positive or negative. When *P* likes, loves, or values another, he has a positive sentiment toward *O*, which we have labeled +*L*. When *P* dislikes *O*, he has a negative sentiment, or -*L*.

Unit relations may also be of two types: separate entities comprise

a unit when one perceives them as either belonging together (+U) or segregated (-U). According to Heider, the Gestalt principles of perceptual organization provide a reliable guide as to whether or not *P* will perceive separate entities as units. Similarity, proximity, common fate, good continuation, set, and past experience are all factors which are said to induce unit formation.

Heider argues it is intuitively obvious which kinds of sentiment and unit relationships are balanced and which are not. In discussing imbalanced relationships, for example, he says:

In some ways we sense that the factors in the situation "do not add up;" they seem to pull in different directions. They leave us with a feeling of disturbance that becomes relieved only when change within the situation takes place in such a way that a state of balance is achieved (p. 180).

Scientists prefer precise rules to intuitions, however. Thus Heider specifies the following rules for determining if a dyadic relationship is balanced or imbalanced: "A dyad is balanced if the relations between the two entities are all positive (+L and +U) or all negative (-L and -U). Disharmony results when relations of different sign character exist" (p. 202).

According to Heider's formulation, sentiment and unit relations tend toward a balanced state. This means, then, that if we can vary the unit relations between people, we should be able to effect their liking for one another. Darley and Berscheid (1967) tested this notion in an ingenious experiment. If one knows he is going to be required to interact intimately with another (thus forming a + unit relationship with him), he will come to like the other.

The authors led college girls to expect that they would soon be discussing their sexual standards with another girl. The students were




Figure 5.1. Graphic Representation of Balanced and Unbalanced States

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then given ambiguous information about the personalities of two girls—their future discussion partner and a stranger with whom they knew they would have no further contact. The girls' impressions of both girls were recorded. It is evident that students develop marked biases in favor of their discussion partners. Whichever girl is introduced as the future partner is seen as being the more likable girl. Girls also claim that had they been allowed to choose their own partner, they would certainly have chosen the girl who had been randomly assigned to be their partner.

An even more striking demonstration that we like those with whom we expect to interact comes from a study by Berscheid, Boye, and Darley (1968). Students were led to believe that they would soon be forced to associate with an undesirable character. Even under such unpromising circumstances students were able to find some good in their partner. They generally stood by their undesirable partner even when they were subsequently allowed to choose any partner they wished.

The finding that forced association breeds acceptance was a source of rare encouragement to community relations experts. Reformers often spend a lifetime trying to change discriminatory policies, only to conclude that their dedicated efforts have changed little. Perhaps they have managed to integrate a few token minority members into new communities or into new occupations. Such realizations are devastating. The preceding research suggests that the modest accomplishments of reformers may not be as limited as they seem. Token integration may do a great deal more than provide improved working conditions for a few minority members. Opponents of reform are fond of arguing that legislation can't change men's hearts. To the extent that legislation forces men to interact, legislation might well have a dramatic impact on their hearts.

Heider's theory also applies to triadic relations: "A triad is balanced when all three of the relations are positive or when two of the relations are negative and one is positive. Imbalance occurs when two of the relations are positive and one is negative" (p. 202).

According to Heider, balanced states are stable states; unbalanced states generally evolve into more balanced states. Thus, from a knowledge of the unit and sentiment relationships existent between people, and a knowledge of whether or not the relationships are balanced, we can predict what kinds of relationships are likely to evolve between individuals. Let us see how this theory operates: Imagine that I like Mae West movies. If my roommate reveals that she shares my enthusiasm for Mae West movies, our relationship is balanced. Someone close to me (+U) likes (+L) the same things that I like (+L). Intuitively, this situation seems psychologically comfort-

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
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able, and, according to Heider's definition the relationship is balanced.

Now imagine that I discover that my roommate (+U) disdains (-L) the Mae West movies I so much admire (+L). My discovery places me in an unpleasant, unbalanced state. The relationship can be restored to balance only if appropriate change are made in our sentiment or our unit relations. Several balance restoring changes are possible: (1) I can decide that anyone who has the poor taste to dislike Mae West movies is not going to be my roommate any longer ($P-UO$); (2) I can decide I don't approve of Mae West after all ($P-LX$); or (3) I can conveniently conclude that my roommate was only teasing, that deep in her heart she really loves Mae West ($O+LX$). Any one of the preceding changes would restore balance to our relationship.

Data exist to support the notion that individuals prefer psychologically balanced states to unbalanced ones, and that unbalanced states are more unstable than balanced ones (Heider, 1958).

Several conclusions follow from the proposition that we will like those who share positive sentiment and unit relations with us: (1) We should generally prefer those who are similar to us to those who are dissimilar. Support for this proposition comes from Byrne and his associates (1961). (2) We should like those who share our own high opinion of ourselves. Support for this plausible conclusion comes from Newcomb (1961) and Backman and Secord (1959). (3) We should like those who live and work in close proximity to ourselves. Evidence for this proposition comes from a variety of sources. For example, students are known to develop stronger friendships with those students who share their classes, reside in their dormitory or apartment building, or who sit near them in class, than with students who are geographically located only slightly further away (Maison-neuve, Palmade, & Fourment, 1952; Willerman & Swanson, 1952; Festinger, 1951; and Byrne & Buehler, 1955).

Proximity is also an important factor in mate selection. The greater the distance between potential marriage partners the less likely they are to marry (Kennedy, 1943; Katz & Hill, 1958). In a perhaps tongue-in-cheek observation, Bossard (1932) notes that individuals already living together are most likely to marry.

FESTINGER'S THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

The balance theory which has generated the most research is Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (1957). The basic unit which the theory utilizes is the "cognition." "Cognition" is any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior that a person might hold.

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Dissonance theory is concerned with the relationship that an individual's ideas have with one another. The theory states that three types of cognitive relationships are possible: dissonant, consonant, or irrelevant relations. Cognitions are said to be in a *dissonant* relationship if they are incompatible. Cognitions can be incompatible for several reasons. They may logically contradict one another, in the individual's own thinking. For example, if a person believes that marihuana rots the mind, and at the same time he believes marihuana is harmless, he would experience dissonance. Cognitions can also be dissonant because they contradict one's past experience. For example, if one discovered that the longer he sunbathed, the whiter his skin became, he would experience dissonance. Cognitive elements are in a *consonant* relationship if one element follows from another on logical or experiential grounds. Finally, cognitions can be in a totally *irrelevant* relationship to one another. For example, the cognitions "letters Q and Z are omitted from the telephone dial" and "very few men wear wool bathing suits" would probably be judged by nearly everyone to be totally irrelevant to one another.

Once we classify cognitions as dissonant, consonant, or irrelevant, we can calculate the total amount of dissonance existing between two clusters of cognitive elements. The magnitude of dissonance may be assessed utilizing the following formula:

$$\text{Dissonance} = \frac{\text{Importance} \times \text{number of dissonant elements}}{(\text{Importance} \times \text{number of dissonant elements}) + (\text{Importance} \times \text{number of consonant elements})}$$

According to Festinger, the existence of dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable and motivates one to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance. The more dissonance one is experiencing, the more eager he will be to reduce his existing dissonance.

There are several ways an individual can eliminate dissonance. He can change his attitude, change his behaviors, or change the relative importance or number of cognitions which support his position. Let us illustrate some of these techniques by example: Imagine that an unmarried Catholic girl is taking birth control pills to prevent pregnancy. She may well experience dissonance, since her behavior is inconsistent with her attitudes. On the one hand, she classifies herself as a good Catholic who rigorously obeys all Church laws. On the other hand, she is aware that by taking the pill she is violating Church law, which proscribes both birth control and sexual dalliance.

How can this girl reduce her dissonance? (1) She can abandon her

dissonant behavior. She can bring her behavior into conformity with her religious values. (2) She can abandon her dissonance-producing attitudes. She can accept the fact that she is not a good Catholic and fall away from the Church. (3) She can add additional cognitive elements to buttress her behavior. For example, she can seek out friends who will persuade her that it is a good idea for her to have sexual relations with her boyfriend, that sexual relations should be separated from procreation, and that she should take the pill to prevent conception. (4) She can reduce the importance of her "un-Catholic" behavior. She can catalog all the Church laws and convince herself that to break only one out of 8,764 laws is really only a minor deviation—especially considering how conscientiously she has avoided "coveting her neighbor's wife," "striking out the eye" of her enemy, and milling corn on the Sabbath.

Researchers interested in interpersonal relations quickly saw and tested the implications of dissonance theory for interpersonal relations. On the basis of the theory, they hypothesized that if an individual is led to treat a neutral stranger in a cruel way or in an uncommonly generous way, his attitudes should soon become consistent with his cruel or generous behavior. If a person harms another, he would be expected to come to dislike the person he has harmed. If he does a favor for another, he would be expected to come to like his beneficiary. Evidence supporting these predictions was discussed in the section on exchange theories.

Researchers also hypothesized that the more perceived choice an individual has about whether to exploit or befriend another person, the more dissonance he should experience, and the more he should reduce his dissonance by denigrating a victim or aggrandizing a beneficiary. These hypotheses were confirmed by Davis and Jones (1960) and Davidson (1964).

Glass (1964) pointed out that the higher an individual's self-esteem is the more it disturbs him to harm another. If one believes that he has a preponderance of unfavorable characteristics, and is just the kind of vile person who would harm others without cause, he should not experience dissonance when he realizes he has injured another. He may well realize that he has behaved in a socially disapproved way. However, his cruel, socially disapproved act is actually consonant with his general low self-regard. When one believes he is a fine, kind, intelligent person, however, the discovery that he has behaved reprehensibly should be much more upsetting. His cruel behavior conflicts both with social norms and with his self-image. Thus, Glass concludes, the higher a harmdoer's self-esteem, the more he should be motivated to explain away his cruel behavior by denigrating his victim.

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Data support Glass' derivations. Glass led students to shock a fellow student. Some students were given a choice about whether or not to shock their comrade; some were simply told they must shock him. The students' liking for their comrade was then assessed. The result indicated that Glass was correct. When students had a choice about whether or not to harm the victim, the harmdoers with high self-esteem defended their actions by denigrating the victim; harmdoers with low self-esteem did not. When subjects were forced to harm the victim, subjects apparently did not experience dissonance. No denigration occurred in either self-esteem condition.

In summary, we can conclude that the balance theories supplement reinforcement theory. Balance theorists point out that the rewarding and punishing experiences we have with others must be organized in meaningful and consistent ways. The balance theory notion that one's behavior and attitudes are generally consistent, and the supporting research lead us to several conclusions: (1) We generally come to like those we help, those who are in close proximity to us, are similar to us, or who like us. (2) We generally come to dislike those who we injure, who are segregated from us, dissimilar to us, or dislike us.

Physiological and Cognitive Determinants of Emotional States

On the basis of an ingenious series of experiments, Schachter (1964) proposed a paradigm for understanding human emotional response. He argued that in order for a person to experience true emotion, two factors must coexist: (1) The individual must be physiologically aroused, and (2) He must label his stirred-up state in emotional terms. Schachter argued that neither physiological arousal nor appropriate labeling *alone* is sufficient to produce an emotional experience.

A drug, Adrenalin, exists whose effects mimic the discharge of the sympathetic nervous system. Shortly after one receives an injection of Adrenalin, systolic blood pressure increases markedly, heart rate increases somewhat, cutaneous blood flow decreases, muscle and cerebral blood flow increase, blood sugar and lactic acid concentration increase, and respiration rate increases slightly. The individual who has been injected with Adrenalin experiences palpitation, tremor, and sometimes flushing and accelerated breathing. These reactions are identical to the physiological reactions which accompany a variety of natural emotional states.

An injection of Adrenalin will not, by itself, engender an emotional response in a person. When an individual is injected with

Adrenalin and asked about his feelings, he will report either no emotional response or, at most, report feeling "as if" he might be experiencing some emotion (Marañon, 1924). The person who has been injected with Adrenalin perceives that something is not quite authentic about his reactions. Schachter argued that what is missing is an appropriate label for the physiological reactions he is experiencing. If Marañon's drugged individuals had been led to attribute their stirred-up state to some emotion-arousing event (rather than attributing it to their shot), Schachter would argue that they would experience a "true" emotion.

In order to test his notion that both physiological arousal and appropriate cognitions are indispensable components of true emotional experiences, Schachter manipulated these two components separately in an experiment. Schachter and Singer (1962) recruited volunteers for an experiment ostensibly investigating the effects on vision of a new vitamin compound, Suproxin. Volunteers were injected with a substance which was identified as Suproxin. Actually, one half of the students were injected with Adrenalin and one half with a placebo. By manipulating an appropriate explanation Schachter wished to lead some of the volunteers to attribute their physiological state to a nonemotional cause (the injection) and others to attribute it to an emotional cause.

In the *nonemotional attribution* condition, individuals were given a complete explanation of how the shot would affect them. They were warned that in 15 to 20 minutes the injection of "Suproxin" would cause palpitation, tremor, etc. Presumably, when students began to experience these symptoms, they could properly attribute their stirred-up state to the shot and would not attribute their excitement to the activities in which they were engaging at the time the Adrenalin began to take effect.

In the *emotional attribution* conditions, things were arranged to discourage students from attributing their stirred-up state to the shot. One group of volunteers was given no information about possible side effects of the shot. Presumably most volunteers would assume that there were no side effects. A second group of volunteers was deliberately misled as to the potential side effects of the shot. They were told the shot might produce an itching sensation all over their body and a slight headache. In both groups it was assumed that volunteers would be unlikely to attribute their tremors and palpitations to the shot (since these symptoms occurred 20 minutes after the shot and were not described as possible consequences of the shot). Instead, it was assumed that they would be likely to attribute their stirred-up state to whatever they happened to be doing when the drug began to take effect 20 minutes after injection. Schachter

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then arranged things so that "what they happened to be doing" was participating in a social setting conducive to producing elation or to producing anger.

Schachter placed students in one of two different settings, a euphoria setting and an anger setting. Some volunteers were placed with an experimental accomplice who had been trained to act euphorically. Some volunteers were placed with an accomplice who was trained to act angrily. Shortly after the volunteer received his injection, he was introduced to another subject. The experimenter indicated that both of them would soon have their vision tested; the tests however could not begin until the "Suproxin" could get from the injection site into the bloodstream (a process which presumably took 20 minutes). Students were told to wait in a room which was in a state of great disarray. There were scratch pads, rubber bands, pencils, etc., littered about. As soon as the experimenter left, the stooge began his dramatic presentation. Schachter (1964) described the euphoria setting:

...the stooge introduced himself again, made a series of standard icebreaker comments, and then went into his routine. He reached first for a piece of paper, doodled briefly, crumpled the paper, aimed for a wastebasket, threw, and missed. This led him to a game of basketball in which he moved around the room crumpling paper and trying out fancy basketball shots. Finished with basketball, he said, "This is one of my good days. I feel like a kid again. I think I'll make a plane." He made a paper plane, spent a few minutes flying it around the room and said, "Even when I was a kid, I was never much good at this." He then tore off the tail of the plane, wadded it up, and making a sling-shot out of a rubber band, began to shoot the paper. While shooting, he noticed a sloppy pile of manila folders. He built a tower of these folders, then went to the opposite end of the room to shoot at the tower. He knocked down the tower and, while picking up the folders, he noticed a pair of hula hoops behind a portable rock board. He took one of these for himself, put the other within reaching distance of the subject, and then began hula-hooping. After a few minutes he replaced the hula hoop and returned to his seat, at which point the experimenter returned to his room (p. 57).

In the anger setting subjects were introduced to the confederate, and asked to fill out a questionnaire while they were waiting for the Suproxin to be absorbed by the bloodstream. This time, however, the confederate's behavior was designed to make the subject angry.

Most people dislike filling out questionnaires, even under the best of circumstances. Multiple-choice questions often force one to choose between several inappropriate or ambiguous answers. Schachter capitalized on this general aversion and attempted to construct a really horrendous questionnaire—one that would offend everyone who read it. This "model" questionnaire asked a series of personal and insulting questions. For example, one question asked: "How many men (other than your father) has your mother had extra-

marital relationships with? (a) Four and under. (b) Five through nine. (c) Ten and over." The confederate pretended to complete the questionnaire along with the subject. The confederate's complaints about the questionnaire were mild at first, he grew increasingly quarrelsome, and finally he became enraged. He ripped up his questionnaire and slammed it to the floor shouting angrily, "I'm not wasting any more time. I'm getting my books and leaving," and stomped out of the room.

Schachter tested the hypothesis that both a physiological and psychological component were necessary for an emotional experience by assessing the subjects' emotional reactions to the confederates' behavior.

After viewing the euphoric or the angry confederate, two measures of the intensity of the subjects' emotional responses were obtained. First, the behavior of the volunteers in the euphoric and the angry conditions was closely recorded by observers stationed behind a one-way mirror. The raters assessed to what extent the subject caught the stooge's euphoric or angry mood. For example, in the euphoria condition observers recorded whether or not the subject tossed paper wads out the window. In the anger condition they recorded whether or not the subject joined the confederate in complaining about the offensiveness of the questions. On the basis of these ratings, an estimate was made as to how euphoric and how angry each subject seemed to be.

A second type of measure, a self-report questionnaire, was also collected. The subject was asked to describe his present mood, and to estimate how euphoric and angry he felt.

The experimental findings confirmed Schachter's theory. When subjects had been informed about the physiological side effects which accompanied the shot, the confederate's euphoria or anger was not contagious. In this condition, subjects were simply puzzled about why the confederate was getting so worked up over nothing. Obviously, subjects concluded, the reason the confederate felt excited was that he had received a shot. Subjects attributed their own stirred-up state to the same source—the shot.

When subjects were ignorant of how they should feel (or had been misinformed) and had received a shot of Adrenalin, they quickly caught the stooge's mood. They were excited and they attributed their stirred-up state not to the shot, but to the "great fun" they were having or to "the insulting questionnaire" they had been asked to answer. They judged themselves to be euphoric or angry. The emotional responses of control subjects (who had received a placebo shot) were muted.

From these findings, Schachter concluded that two components

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were necessary before an individual could experience a true emotion. (1) He must become emotionally aroused. (2) He must be able to attribute this arousal to some emotional cause.

The Schachterian framework generates a number of intriguing hypotheses concerning romantic attraction. Our reactions to other people are often inconsistent, vague, and difficult to label. In many cases we are unsure of what we feel or why we feel it. Given this state of affairs, it seems plausible that whether or not an aroused individual will conclude he is "in love" will depend to a great extent on how those around him interpret his behavior.

Schachter made several wildly creative and semiserious suggestions as to how one might indirectly implant in a reluctant suitor the notion that he was in love.

For example, in one scenario, a Machiavellian teaching assistant would strategically mount a heat lamp in the ceiling of his office. As soon as an eligible male came to visit, an attractive young coed would casually sit down next to him. The teaching assistant would be in control of the heat lamp. When the visitor turned to speak to the girl, the teaching assistant would turn on the heat lamp. The visitor should soon notice that he was growing warm; perhaps blushing. The instant he turned his attention away from the girl and toward the TA, the heat lamp would be turned off. The visitor would discover that he had become his usual poised, cool self. Again and again, as the visitor shifted his attention from the girl to the TA, he would find his temperature fluctuating. We might expect that the boy would soon begin to wonder why the girl unnerved him to such an extent; possibly he would conclude that he was unusually attracted to her.

Of course, the content of the girl's conversation would be very important in determining whether or not the boy interpreted his blushing as affection. If the girl were cold and sarcastic he might well interpret his "blushing discomfort" as embarrassment or as hostility.

Schachter's reasoning reminds us of an important principle: One should be very careful about the emotional interpretations he supplies to others. When one labels another's reactions, he may well be creating reality, rather than merely interpreting it. The wife, unsure of her husband, who keeps complaining: "You don't love me, you just think you do. If you loved me you wouldn't treat me this way," is voicing a dangerous conclusion. She may turn out to be right. By consistently interpreting her husband's actions in a damaging way, for long enough, she may effect an actual alteration in his feelings for her.

When one re-examines the romantic literature from the Schachterian perspective, one is surprised at how easily previously inexplicable phenomena fit into his framework. (See Walster, 1970.)

Romantic love has always been acknowledged to be a puzzling phenomenon; love often seems to emerge under the most unlikely conditions. Poets and writers chronicle the stories of disastrous affairs in which one loves the one woman who cannot love him. Young lovers sometimes discover they are hopelessly in love, often at the very time when it is most important to inhibit sexual expression. Individuals sometimes find that they love and hate the same person. Superficially, these observations are puzzling. Some of these variables (loneliness, anger, frustration, etc.) seem more likely to predispose individuals to dislike others rather than to love them. Poets have been inclined to attribute these inexplicable choices to the essential illogic of love. But the Schachterian framework offers another explanation. Perhaps it does not really matter how one produces an agitated state in the lover. So long as one can lure the lover into labeling his agitation as passion, one may secure the emotional response he wishes. If this conclusion is true we may have a key to a previously enigmatic phenomenon.

Many writers have noticed that strong emotional arousal breeds love—although not, of course, interpreting this relationship in Schachterian terms. Finck (1891), for example, concludes:

Love can only be excited by strong and vivid emotions, and it is almost immaterial whether these emotions are agreeable or disagreeable. The Cid wooed the proud heart of Diana Ximene, whose father he had slain, by shooting one after another of her pet pigeons. Such persons as arouse in us only weak emotions or none at all, are obviously least likely to incline us toward them . . . Our aversion is most likely to be bestowed on individuals who, as the phrase goes, are neither "warm" nor "cold"; whereas impulsive, choleric people, though they may readily offend us, are just as capable of making us warmly attached to them (p. 240).

Valins (1966) speculated that, in generating emotion, it is probably more important that one believe that he is having a strong physical reaction to another than that he actually have one. Valins tested his hypothesis in an ingenious experiment. Valins recruited male college students for a study of males' physiological reactions to sexual stimuli. The sexual stimuli Valins used were ten seminude *Playboy* photographs. Men were told that while they scrutinized these photographs, their heartbeat rate would be amplified and recorded. Men were led to believe that their heartbeat rate altered markedly to some of the photographs but that they had no reaction at all to others. (Valins assumed that men would interpret an alteration in heart rate as sexual enthusiasm.)

The men's liking for the "arousing" and "nonarousing" photographs was then assessed in three ways. (1) Men were asked to rate how "attractive or appealing" each pin-up was. Men preferred the

pin-ups that offered a positive response. They chose the most attractive ones. (3) For different conditions, different pin-ups. See the following section on arousing pin-ups.

Brehm's framework demonstrates that the introduction of a new variable would unduly complicate the attribution of the effect.

The evidence indicates that physiological arousal can experience a significant determinant of how we respond.

"Social influence changes the attitude and the expectation of influence."

How do we change our attitude to respond to a favorable or unfavorable group of people? These two conditions are the key to the change.

A barber, who enters his shop to influence the crew cuts, the shaggy, ratty barber is hoping toward the crew barber might

pin-ups they believed were arousing to all others. (2) Men were offered a pin-up in remuneration for participating in the experiment. They chose the arousing pin-ups more often than the non-arousing ones. (3) Finally, men were interviewed a month later (in a totally different context) and asked to rank the attractiveness of the pin-ups. Several weeks later the men still markedly preferred the arousing pin-ups to the others.

Brehm et al. (1970) found some evidence that the Schachterian framework may be applicable in romantic settings. The authors demonstrated that when males were severely frightened before being introduced to an attractive girl, they liked her better than they would under normal conditions. Presumably, men would rather attribute their beating heart to affection than to cowardice.

The evidence seems to be compelling that two components—physiological arousal and appropriate labeling—must exist before one can experience true emotion. The judgments of those around us as to how we should label our experiences thus become important determinants of what we do experience.

Antecedents of Social Influence

Definitions

“Social influence” refers to the power individuals possess to affect the attitudes and behaviors of others. When one persuades others to change their *attitudes*, or when he forces them to *conform* to his expectations regardless of their attitudes, he is exerting “social influence.”

How do the two components of social influence—conformity and attitude change—differ? An *attitude* is defined as a person’s readiness to respond toward a particular object, or class of objects in a favorable or unfavorable manner. *Conformity* is defined as a behavioral change that occurs as a result of some real or imagined group of pressures. We can easily demonstrate the difference between these two concepts with a practical example.

A barber, who is determined that the long-haired young men who enter his shop will emerge with wholesome crew cuts, might attempt to influence his client’s attitudes by pointing out the advantages of crew cuts, and the numerous liabilities of “curly, fuzzy, snaggy, shaggy, ratty, matty, oily, greasy . . . hair.” By his arguments, the barber is hoping to transform the client’s neutral or negative attitude toward crew cuts into a positive one. If persuasion fails, however, the barber might resort to forcing his client to *conform* to his dictates.

The barber might warn his patron that if he does not let the barber dictate his hair style, the client might get an "extra-close" shave

Although in the preceding example the distinction between conformity and attitude change seems clear, in practice it is often difficult to distinguish between them. Often men who seem to be acting out of conviction are really only reluctantly acquiescing to social pressure. Sometimes men who have been coerced into conforming end up changing their convictions. This section will focus on the antecedents of both conformity and attitude change. In the few cases when a variable is known to effect *only* conformity or *only* attitude change, we will point out this fact.

In the previous section we reviewed several theories which help us to understand why individuals like or dislike others. These same theories are useful in predicting when individuals will be influenced by others.

Learning Theory

In 1898 Thorndike proposed a simple learning paradigm: "Pleasure stamps in; pain stamps out." Unfortunately learning theorists were not satisfied with this tidy formulation; they soon developed more complicated, and somewhat more accurate theories about the way rewards and punishments affect attitudes and behavior. (See, for example, Doob, 1947; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Scott, 1959; and Staats, 1967.)

If society properly applied reinforcements, it could have an enormous impact on human behavior. However, learning theory principles are seldom utilized in solving important social problems. Why has such useful information been so neglected?

To control another's reinforcements, one must be able to control himself and the environment. To gain such control is often impossible. As McConnell (1970) points out:

We can train flatworms to do a great many things because we've learned the proper techniques and because we follow instructions exactly . . .

It took years, but we now know enough that we can train the animals very quickly. We have no trouble training worms, but we have one hell of a time trying to train new laboratory assistants. We explain our findings to them, and they nod their heads, but they don't really believe us and they don't really understand.

I have a friend, a distinguished scientist, who visited my lab one day. He was so fascinated by the worms that he wanted to train one himself . . .

The flatworm crawled along the maze quite nicely, came to the first choice point, and headed into the black alley. Of course, my friend pressed on the wrong button, gave a shock of the wrong polarity and propelled the poor worm into the black alley. "Silly animal," the man muttered; he pressed the wrong button again. The worm went further into the wrong alley. "Get out

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of there, you idiot," he shouted at the worm, and held the shock button down for several seconds.

The worm, I regret to say, went into convulsions about this time and simply lay on its back writhing. My friend thrust the control apparatus back into my hands, advised me that the damned worm was obviously too stupid to learn even the simplest task, and stalked out of the lab.

The more that I think about it, the more convinced I am that the mistake was all mine. Why should I let him try to train a worm . . . or a rat . . . or a human being unless he had been given the proper education first? (p. 14-15)

Perhaps the most explicit theory concerning the impact that rewards and punishments have on attitudes was developed by Doob (1947). According to Doob, an attitude is "an implicit response." It is "evoked by a variety of stimulus patterns, as a result of previous learning or of gradients of generalization and discrimination." That is, attitudes are learned, and are expressed only in appropriate situations. Doob argues that whether an attitude will persist or will change depends on at least three factors. (1) *The reward or punishment associated with the expression of the attitude.* An attitude will persist when it is consistently reinforced; it will change when it is partially or wholly extinguished. (2) *Conflicts with competing drives.* If the drive strength of an attitude is weak in comparison with other attitudes or drives which are aroused simultaneously, the attitude may be suppressed. For example, an individual may possess an extremely unfavorable attitude toward traffic policemen. When he is stopped by a policeman, however, he might carefully avoid expressing his negative attitude because he has an even stronger prejudice against going to jail. He behaves, therefore, in accord with the stronger attitude. (3) *The process of forgetting.* If the stimulus patterns which arouse the attitude do not appear in the environment for a length of time, the attitude may weaken.

One of the first experiments investigating the efficacy of reinforcement in modifying attitudes was reported by Razran (1940). Razran chose social political slogans such as "Down with War and Racism!" and "America for Americans" as his attitudinal stimuli. One set of slogans was presented when his hungry subjects were enjoying a free lunch. The other set of slogans was presented when the subjects were surrounded by disgusting odors. After several such "conditioning" sessions, observers rated the attractiveness of each slogan. Razran found that slogans associated with the lunch (reinforcement) increased in attractiveness; slogans associated with unpleasant odors (punishment) became less attractive. Razran (1940), Staats, Staats, and Briggs (1958), and Janis, Kaye, and Kirschner (1965) also demonstrated the effectiveness of reinforcements in modifying attitudes.

Learning Theory Versus Dissonance Theory

For the most part, reinforcement and cognitive consistency theories supplement one another. In a very few instances the two theories make opposite predictions. One theoretical conflict has generated unusual controversy.

Learning theory predicts that the more reward associated with an act, the more pleasure the actor experiences when contemplating the act and the more inclined he is to repeat the act. Dissonance theory makes an opposite prediction. It predicts that the less incentive a person has to perform an act, the more compelled he is to personally defend his action once he's done it. Thus, they predict the less you offer someone to do something, the more he will come to value doing it for its own sake.

The focal point of the reinforcement-dissonance controversy has been an experiment conducted by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). In this experiment, the authors asked students to perform a very monotonous task. After a student had completed it, the experimenter implored him to "pinch-hit" for his regular research assistant, who had failed to show up, and to inform the next subject that the task he had just performed was "very interesting." The amount of money the students were offered to lie was varied. Some were offered \$1.00 to lie, others were offered \$20.00. After a subject had lied to his fellow student, he was asked to evaluate the experiment. The results supported the dissonance theory prediction. The less money the subject was given to praise the boring experiment, the more inclined he was to argue that the experiment was an interesting one. Aronson and Carlsmith (1963) and Freedman (1963) provided further support for the dissonance predictions and further opposition to reinforcement predictions.

Proponents of "incentive theory" soon took up the cudgels. Janis and Gilmore (1965) and Rosenberg (1965) conducted experiments, which they argued explained away the dissonance findings and supported the reinforcement theory. Dissonance theorists such as Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) quickly countered with research in which they explained away the reinforcement findings and supported the dissonance point of view.

The results of most recent experiments indicate that both theories are partially correct. In a theoretical discussion of the issues involved in the dissonance-incentive controversy and an accompanying review of the literature, Aronson (1966) concludes that high incentives, taken by themselves, may lead a person to greater attitude change. If, however, a powerful opposing force, due to dissonance, is set into motion, the dissonance-reduction effects may overpower the effects

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due to incentive. Dissonance effects and reinforcement effects seem *not* to be mutually exclusive; reinforcement effects will emerge when cognitive dissonance has been minimized in the experimental operations. Research by Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich (1966) supports this notion.

Essentially, then, human behavior seems to be a compromise between the desire to secure immediate rewards and the desire to appear to be logically consistent.

Conformity Versus Attitude Change

Thus far we have surveyed those factors which effect both conformity and attitude change. However, some authors have focused on the differences in these two forms of social influence, rather than on the similarities.

Festinger (1953) distinguished between compliance (public compliance without private acceptance) and attitude change (public compliance with private acceptance). According to Festinger, threats may make a man conform, but they will not change his attitudes. He argues that a person will change his attitudes only if his relationship with the communicator is valuable to him.

Simply by observing people, it is, of course, difficult to determine whether they are conforming out of fear or conviction. Festinger (1953) proposed two methods for empirically distinguishing between compliance and true attitude change. The two techniques he proposed were: (1) "Observation of public behavior together with the elicitation of a private response" (p. 247). An individual who takes a different position, in private, than he is willing to admit to in public, would seem to be more of a conformer than a "true believer." (2) "Observation of behavior before and after the removal of the source of influence" (p. 246). If the instant the communicator's influence is removed, an individual stops complying, it seems obvious that previously he was merely complying because of social pressures.

Festinger's point can easily be illustrated. Suppose one Sunday afternoon a young woman is observed at a zoo entrance milling around with a large group of people, and carrying a sign which reads "Zoos are Prisons—Free the Animals." The young woman may be picketing the zoo because: (1) Her boyfriend has issued an ultimatum: "No picketing, no dates." (2) Her zoology text has convinced her that zoos are inhumane. (3) She was hired as a shill by the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.

Festinger would argue that we can determine whether the girl's behavior was conformity or attitude change by observing her

behavior at a subsequent zoo demonstration, when the preceding influences have been removed—that is, we can examine the girl's behavior when she has switched to a less domineering boyfriend, she has completed her zoology course, or the SPCA has run out of money. If, in spite of the changed conditions the girl nevertheless was present and waving her sign at the next zoo gathering, we could guess that her crusading actions had become independent of the original influence. We would assume true attitude change had occurred. If, on the other hand, the girl rudely snickered and pointed at the demonstrators while walking her leashed and muzzled dog, it is likely that her former feelings toward animals were transient and depended on external encouragement.

Kelman (1961) distinguishes among *three* different types of social influence—compliance (similar to Festinger's "public compliance without private acceptance"), identification (similar to "public compliance with private acceptance"), and internalization. According to Kelman:

Compliance can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence from another person or from a group because he hopes to achieve a favorable reaction from the other. He may be interested in attaining certain specific rewards or in avoiding certain specific punishments that the influencing agent controls (p. 462).

Identification can be said to occur when an individual adopts behavior derived from another person or a group because this behavior is associated with a satisfying self-defining relationship to this person or group (p. 463)

Internalization can be said to occur when an individual accepts influence because the induced behavior is congruent with his value system (p. 465).

Kelman cautions that these three processes of social influence are not mutually exclusive and would rarely exist in a pure state in nature.

In summary, two general theoretical approaches, learning theory and cognitive consistency theory, are useful guides to improving social influence.

Learning theory posits that if one can control the administration and timing of reinforcements, he can develop and maintain the attitudes he wishes in others. To be effective in changing attitudes, however, one must be precise in his application of learning theory principles. Dissonance theory posits that individuals relentlessly pursue cognitive consistency. Attitudes which are consistent with other cognitions will be stable and difficult to change. If one wishes to change attitudes, he should make the attitude he wishes to establish appear to be consistent with the listener's other cognitions and make the attitudes which he wishes to change appear to be incompatible with the listener's other cognitions.

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Interpersonal Attraction and Social Influence

Empirical Evidence

Interpersonal attraction and social influence are so intimately related that if one understands each process, he can probably intuit the relationships between them. Thus, many readers may already feel they can guess at many of the ways in which attraction and influence are related. Nearly all theorists agree that a likable person will be more effective in exerting social influence than will be a less likable person. Some theorists have attempted to specify precisely the relationship between these two variables: they contend that there is a monotonic relationship between attractiveness and the ability to elicit attitude change or conformity (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Moreno, 1934; and Kelley & Shapiro, 1954).

Among the first studies to demonstrate that likable people are influential people were the classic investigations of group cohesiveness. *Group cohesiveness* denotes the attraction of membership in a group for its members.

Cohesiveness theorists argue that the more attractive a group is to its members, the more eager these members will be to prevent the group from disintegrating, and thus the harder they will try to secure agreement on important issues. For example, Festinger, et al. (1952) argue that "... pressures toward uniformity in a group are manifested in at least three ways: by readiness to change (one's own) opinion, by attempts to influence others in the group, and by a tendency to reject disagreeers from the group" (p. 327). These three procedures combine to insure that cohesive groups will be more uniform than will be noncohesive groups.

Back (1951) demonstrated that in cohesive groups, members do make unusual efforts to agree with their colleagues or to persuade their colleagues to agree with them.

Back manipulated cohesiveness in an imaginative way. In essence, Back applied Lawrence Durrell's (1961) insight to the laboratory. Durrell said:

Balthazar claimed once that he could induce love as a control experiment by a simple action: namely telling each of two people who had never met that the other was dying to meet them, had never seen anyone so attractive, and so on. This was, he claimed, infallible as a means of making them fall in love: they always did . . .

This insight was translated into an experimental manipulation in the following way: In some groups Back told members that they were likely to get along remarkably well with their discussion partner. In other groups he told individuals that they would probably

get along "alright." As Back had hoped, individuals who were assured they would especially like their companions did; individuals who were not given such information did not.

All partners were then subtly, but effectively, led to hold different opinions on a single issue. They were shown photographs of a discussion between a middle-aged man and a youth, and asked to make up a story about the discussion. Although ostensibly both partners had received the same pictures, actually the sets were slightly different. In one set, the middle-aged man appeared to be directing the discussion, in the other, the youth was clearly in command. Each partner then wrote his own story about the pictures. (This undoubtedly crystallized their divergent impressions.) Then the partners discussed their stories. To their consternation, they soon discovered that they had interpreted the same set of pictures in diametrically opposed ways.

Back found that in the cohesive groups, members made a *greater* effort to argue out their differences than did members of less cohesive groups. In less cohesive groups, members tended to withdraw from the discomfiting discussion. The intense persuasive efforts made in cohesive groups seem to have been generally successful. By the end of the discussion, compatible groups agreed on an interpretation of the picture sequence more than did less friendly groups.

Festinger et al. (1952) also documented that members of highly cohesive groups are especially receptive to their partners' influence attempts. They manipulated cohesiveness much as Back had done: by leading some people to believe that their group would be unusually congenial and leading others to believe that scheduling problems had made the aggregation of a congenial group difficult. The authors then led some of the members in the various groups to believe that few group members shared their opinions. Upon making the discovery that they deviated from the group, members of highly congenial groups changed their opinions more readily than did members of the uncongenial groups.

Many recent researchers (e.g., Hare, 1962; Lott & Lott, 1961) corroborate the finding that attractive groups demand and secure unusual conformity from their members.

Theoretical Bases for the Attraction-Influence Relationship

Virtually all the theories we have discussed would lead us to expect attractive communicators to be especially effective communicators. The various theories disagree, however, about what particular characteristic of the likable person makes him so effective. Attracted

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people differ in many ways from others. For example, if all we know about two individuals is that they are "friends," we would be wise to guess that they probably live near to one another, that they have plans to see one another soon, that they hold similar opinions, and that they mediate valuable rewards for one another.

Many theories would emphasize these correlated variables in their attempts to explain why likable people will be powerful people, rather than concentrating on the impact of liking itself. Learning and cognitive theories would focus on liking itself in attempting to explain the interpersonal attraction social influence relationship.

Let us first consider those explanations for the fact that likable people are influential people which focus on variables correlated with liking.

LIKING, PROPINQUITY, AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

One generally spends a great deal of time with his friends, and conscientiously avoids his enemies. Newcomb (1961) shrewdly observes that people rarely have to "fight it out" with their enemies. They simply avoid seeing those they feel are obnoxious long before things ever get to the fighting stage.

The fact that we voluntarily spend most of our time with those we like gives our friends an enormous advantage in influencing us. They have almost unlimited opportunities to present us with the persuasive information they possess. Thus, the fact that a friend is a frequent associate gives him an extra advantage in exerting social influence.

LIKING, COMMITMENT, AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

During the course of friendship, one commits himself in numerous ways to his friends. He commits himself to seeing his friends at various times in the future, to treating them with kindness and consideration, to helping them out of difficulties (or at least not unduly adding to their problems), etc. Such commitments may seem trivial, but they have been found to be enormously important in shaping behavior (see Brehm & Cohen, 1962).

Several theorists have pointed out how important such commitments can be in crystallizing attitude change. Kelman (1961) distinguished three types of social influence—compliance, identification, and internalization. Presumably, the first two types of social influence—compliance and identification—cannot occur unless the listener is committed to the communicator. According to Kelman, a communicator can elicit compliance or identification only so long as the listener is committed to his relationship with the communicator. The minute the relationship is permanently dissolved, the communi-

cator's message will lose all effectiveness. The importance of commitment in facilitating attitude change has been demonstrated experimentally (cf. Kiesler & Corbin, 1965).

LIKING, THE POWER TO PRAISE OR REJECT OTHERS, AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Everyone wants to be liked. Most individuals will markedly alter their behavior in order to win social approval.

The story may be apocryphal, but according to student lore, professors find vague signs of life in their students so rewarding, that if a group of students follow some simple procedures, they can easily condition their professor to perform bizarre behaviors. The following strategy is reputed to be effective: When the professor lectures in his normal voice, the students look blank or bored. However, every time he raises his voice or strikes the lectern to emphasize a point, a marked transformation occurs in the students—they beam with enthusiasm and sudden understanding. According to students and reinforcement theorists, the professor should soon learn to lecture in an ear-shattering shout, accompanied by vigorous pounding.

The approval of strangers is valuable to us, but the approval of our intimates is indispensable. The idea that our friends might cease to like us is very threatening. Thus, when they wish to influence us, friends have an especially valuable resource available to them. A friend can hint that he will continue to like us only if we continue to comply with his wishes. Of course, an acquaintance could make similar threats, but since we are less emotionally dependent on acquaintances than on friends, such threats would be far less potent.

A person's concern that his friends will reject him if he does not conform to their standards is usually a realistic concern. Few groups will tolerate nonconformity. Festinger et al. (1952) point out that on important issues, friends are even less tolerant of deviance than are strangers!

There is abundant evidence that one must conform or face rejection. In a classic study, Newcomb (1943) found that girls who did not conform with the political views that were cherished on their campus were almost always unpopular. Newcomb conducted his research at Bennington College in 1935-1939. At that time the Bennington faculty was uniformly liberal. The arriving students were not. Tuition was high, and entering students usually came from wealthy—and Republican—families. But students were soon socialized into liberal Bennington attitudes. For example, in the 1936 election, 62 percent of the newly-arrived freshmen were for the Republican candidate. Only 14 percent of the juniors and seniors favored the Republicans. As might be anticipated in such a political

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climate, individual prestige among upperclassmen was related to liberal attitudes.

The liberal political attitudes which were instilled in the Bennington girls were remarkably stable. In 1960, some twenty years after the girls had first been interviewed, Newcomb (1963) again interviewed the original sample. He discovered that very few of the matrons had drifted back into the conservative attitudes of their parents. When compared with a sample of American women of the same socioeconomic class, Bennington women were exceptionally liberal in their political views.

Tightly controlled experimental studies have also demonstrated that the penalty of deviation is rejection. Scientists from seven nations—Belgium, England, France, Germany, Holland, Norway, and Sweden—combined forces to conduct a most unusual experiment. Schachter et al. (1954) planned experiments to determine whether or not children from a wide variety of nations would be as relentless in their rejection of deviants as were American children.

The experiments were conducted in the following way. In each country, boys' aviation clubs were organized. A recruiter explained to boys that the Institute of Aviation was interested in forming clubs for interested boys. The clubs were glamorous organizations. Members would meet pilots, build models, see aviation movies, visit airfields, fly, etc. Needless to say, boys eagerly joined these clubs.

The experiment was conducted during each club's organizational meeting. At the start of the first meeting a model-building competition was announced. The experimenter described five different model airplane kits to the boys. Four of the models were extremely attractive motor-driven airplanes; the fifth was a plain glider. The boys were asked to choose a model and work on it together. Almost all of the boys preferred to work on the motor-driven model. One boy, however, was a confederate of the experimenters, and he always chose the glider. A discussion about the merits of the various planes then ensued. Throughout the discussion the confederate defended his deviant position in an objective and nonaggressive manner. Eventually, the experimenter terminated the discussion and then asked the boys to vote on the airplane they wished to build.

The experimenter was able to ascertain how much the deviate was liked compared to the other boys under the pretext of getting the club organized. Boys were told they would work together in small groups and were asked for their preferences in work partners. In addition, boys were asked to vote for a club president. The data made it clear that rejection is virtually a universal reaction to a deviate. In all countries the boy who stuck to his own deviate

opinion was considered undesirable as either a working partner or as a club president. People are acutely aware that if they are deviant they will be estranged. Thus, when another's regard is important to them they are generally willing to conform to his standards—or at least pretend to do so. (See Jones, 1963.)

Often our loved ones control our attitudes and behavior so subtly and so persuasively that we do not even notice we are systematically conforming to their demands. Many of us do not even recognize the restraints that have been imposed on us until a sudden opportunity for liberation occurs and we experience an exhilarating rush of freedom.

Durrell (1961) discusses such a phenomenon when he reports the liberation one feels when wearing a mask:

But what stamps the carnival with its spirit of pure mischief is the velvet domino—conferring upon its wearers the disguise which each man in his secret heart desires above all. To become anonymous in an anonymous crowd, revealing neither sex nor relationship nor even facial expression . . . Nothing else to distinguish one by; the thick folds of the blackness conceal even the contours of the body. Everyone becomes hipless, breastless, faceless. And concealed beneath the carnival habit (like a criminal desire in the heart, a temptation impossible to resist, an impulse which seems preordained) lie the germs of something; of a freedom which man has seldom dared to imagine for himself. One feels free in this disguise to do whatever one likes without prohibition. All the best murders in the city, all the most tragic cases of mistaken identity, are the fruit of the yearly carnival; while most love affairs begin or end during these three days and nights during which we are delivered from the thrall of personality, from the bondage of ourselves (p. 191).

For Americans, conventions provide a ritualized opportunity to escape from usual inhibitions and restraints. The sudden attainment of anonymity produces unusual liberation for the convention delegate, and as a result he feels free to revel in most uncharacteristic behavior. As Festinger et al. (1952) observed, "The delegates to an American Legion convention, all dressed in the same uniform manner, will sometimes exhibit an almost overwhelming lack of restraint." Their research, and subsequent research by Singer, Brush, and Lubin (1965) and Zimbardo et al. (1967) confirm the hypothesis that when individuals feel anonymous (or "deindividuated") they are most likely to engage in socially disapproved behavior.

Likable people, then, have an advantage in controlling our attitudes and behavior because their regard is unusually important to us. We soon learn how readily our friends will reject us if we behave "peculiarly," and learn to acquiesce—almost automatically—to the standards of those whose good opinion we value.

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LIKING, BALANCE, AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

The prediction that likable people will be persuasive people flows most directly from Heider's (1958) balance theory. When we agree with a friend—or disagree with an enemy—about some issue, we are in a comfortable, balanced state. If we disagree with a friend or agree with an enemy on some issue, however, we are in an imbalanced, unstable state.

An individual in an unbalanced state can reestablish balance in several ways: He can repudiate his friendship. He can change his opinion on the single issue in question. Usually, friends are seen as being less expendable than one's convictions.

According to the balance formulation, then, friends are much more effective communicators than neutral acquaintances or enemies. An enemy is not only an ineffective communicator—he is a disastrous one. The minute a disliked communicator upholds a cause, his listeners are likely to unite to defeat it.

Several generations of cunning, devious, and slippery researchers have been fascinated by the notion that one could recruit individuals to a cause by arguing against it. A typical fantasy runs something like this: An advertising agency would be hired to promote the election of Candidate Charlatan. The agency would immediately issue an announcement that they were donating their services to help elect his rival, Candidate Smith. With an unfailing eye, the ad agency would then round up a collection of Smith supporters, so repulsive in appearance and so obnoxious in manner, that they would unfailingly engender hatred in any voter. These offensive backers would then deliver their endorsements. One would expect these endorsements to be totally effective—in motivating voters to support our Charlatan.

Just what it takes to design a speech so poor that it drives people in the opposite direction has been the subject of much speculation. Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953) suggested several rules to guide one in producing boomerang effects. They suggest that a boomerang communication: (1) be delivered by a noncredible source; (2) contain no arguments favorable to the position taken in the communication, since even ridiculous arguments are taken seriously by many people; (3) lead audience members to anticipate that the communicator's conclusions will consistently oppose their own best interests; (4) arouse anger or resentment, by making offensive statements; (5) cause the communicatee to experience guilt and anxiety from the realization that he was in the process of accepting a position that is contrary to beliefs and standards of a group he

values; and (6) take a position so outrageously far from the initial position of the audience that a "contrast" effect occurs (cf. Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965).

In spite of the plausibility of these recommendations, researchers have found it extremely difficult to produce boomerang effects in either laboratory or field settings. Thus far, only Cohen (1962), Berscheid (1966), and Abelson and Miller (1967) have been successful in devising successful boomerang effects.

Abelson and Miller produced boomerangs by utilizing the services of an insulting communicator. The experimenter posed as a roving reporter, interviewing individuals seated on park benches in Washington Square Park in New York City. After a person had been asked what he thought about Negro protest against job discrimination, a confederate seated nearby took exception to the speaker's statements. In one condition, the confederate simply stated his opposition to the subject. In the insult condition, the confederate also expressed his opposition, but this time he prefaced each of *his* opinion statements with an insult. He made such comments as: "That's ridiculous"; "That's the sort of thing you'd expect to hear in this part"; "That's obviously wrong"; "That's terribly confused"; or "No one really believes that." As was expected, the insulted individual became a more extreme advocate of his initial position than he had been before the gratuitous attack. Shouting wins enemies, not votes.

In summary, the evidence is abundant that likable people are unusually persuasive in a wide variety of situations. The communicator who is liked by his listeners is likely to possess a panoply of assets. He is likely to have easy access to the desired audience, to be perceived as a credible person, and to control important rewards for the listeners. These assets augment the advantage that likability itself gives one in persuading others.

The advice that when one wishes to persuade he should choose a communicator who is attractive to the audience may sound obvious. However, it is advice that is most difficult to follow. Those who plan attitude-change campaigns are subject to the same psychological laws as are those they are trying to persuade. Thus, public relations men often end up choosing a communicator who is attractive to *them* rather than a communicator who is attractive to their intended audience. The middle class, WASP, clean-shaven ad man who designs a campaign to convince drug users that speed is dangerous knows intellectually that he should get a communicator that is attractive to the drug culture. In his heart, however, he cannot really believe that a long-haired, disheveled individual is an "attractive" communicator, even though group members tell him so. "Perhaps if the model just

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combed his hair *a little*, or clipped his sideburns." "Perhaps if he just wore a tie—a mod tie, of course." It is difficult for anyone to recognize that attractiveness does not reside in the object, but only in the eye of the beholder.

Usually it is only when an individual designs an appeal for his colleagues that he can select a truly "attractive," and effective, communicator. One of the most cunning and successful advertisements arguing that "Speed Kills" was designed by Frank Zappa of the Mothers of Invention. In a low-key appeal, Zappa said, "I would like to suggest that you do not use speed and here is why: It's going to mess up your heart, mess up your liver, kidneys and rot out your mind. In general, this drug will make you just like your father and mother." To the student group, this ad had great appeal. It is unlikely that parents, trying to convince their children of the same point, could have designed such a message, or would have had the ability to spot Zappa as an "attractive" communicator.

Exceptions to the Rule that Attraction Facilitates Social Influence

Assessing the Bases of Our Opinions

In only a few very special circumstances would one hesitate to employ the most likable person available as his communicator. Most of the time individuals respond in a semiautomatic way to influence attempts. After a communication is over, they certainly do not usually spend much time assessing how much their attitudes have changed, and trying to disentangle how much of the change in attitudes should be attributed to the communicator's likability and how much should be attributed to the compelling content of the message. In fact, people are probably generally reluctant to admit that the noncontent aspects of the message had *any* effect on their attitudes. On rare occasions, however, individuals do engage in such introspection. On occasion it becomes very important for one to be as objective as possible. At such times, individuals often try to identify and eliminate any nonrational pressures that might be effecting their behavior or attitudes. For example, imagine that a student is faced with the necessity of choosing a major. He may well make unusual efforts to analyze to what extent his inclination to become a brain surgeon is due to parental pressure, or to what extent his inclination to become a revolutionary is due to his girlfriend's enthusiasms. He hopes that by pinpointing such influences, he may be able to discount them somehow, and thereby, discover what *he*

really wants to do. Usually when one tries to disentangle "illegitimate" influences from "rational" influences, he succeeds only in getting very confused.

On those rare occasions when a listener is trying very hard to assess and discount any such illegitimate influences on his attitudes, the attractive communicator might well lose the advantage he normally possesses. In a dissonance experiment, Zimbardo (1969) demonstrated that under certain very special conditions an attractive communicator may be a liability. The rationale for the experiment was as follows: The person who finds himself responding to an enemy's argument should experience dissonance; the person who finds himself agreeing with a friend should not.

When the person tries to analyze his reason for accepting the friend's or enemy's message, he has only two alternatives: (1) He can conclude that his change of heart was due to the obvious correctness of the message. (2) He can conclude that his conversion is due to the skill of the communicator. When one hates the communicator, it is undoubtedly more satisfying to attribute one's change of heart to the validity of the arguments than to attribute one's conversion to the charm of the obnoxious communicator. The person who was swayed by the attractive communicator, on the other hand, should be more willing to admit that his conversion could have been partially due to the persuasive skill of the communicator. Zimbardo argues that if one has a good enough communication to completely change everyone's attitudes, he is better off having an unattractive communicator deliver it.

The details of Zimbardo et al.'s (1967) somewhat flamboyant experiment are interesting. The experiment was billed as a study of soldiers' and students' preferences for various survival foods. The authors chose as their communicator the brigade commander of NYU-ROTC. Zimbardo's first step was to teach the commander to be attractive or obnoxious at will. When the commander wanted to be an attractive person, he was unfailingly considerate and pleasant to an "assistant" helping with the experiment. He politely phrased his requests, called the assistant by his first name, and responded to a mistake by the assistant with equanimity and good humor. When the commander was posing as an obnoxious person, however, his behavior was quite different. He was cold and formal with his assistant. He referred to him by his last name and ordered him about in an annoyed and irritated way. When the assistant mistakenly brought in the wrong experimental food, the commander lost his temper and berated him. That the commander was insincere as well as offensive was also made evident when immediately after shouting at the assistant, he returned to the group, flashed a pasteboard smile,

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and continued speaking in the same agreeable tones that he had used before losing his temper.

After the commander was established as a "good guy" or a "bad guy," he delivered his persuasive communication. He attempted to persuade individuals to try a revolting survival food—fried grasshoppers. It is clear that fried grasshoppers were unattractive to participants. When they were asked to list their associations to fried grasshoppers, the following associations emerged: ugly, greasy appearance, slimy, shiny, charred, repulsive, squirming, eyes, wing, dirty, rat faces, might hurt me, burned them as a child, biology laboratory, graveyard, and not kosher. Nevertheless, about half of the participants (in both conditions) acquiesced to the commander's request to try grasshoppers.

The pattern of Zimbardo et al.'s results is clear and it supports the author's hypothesis. The individuals who tried the grasshoppers exaggerated their palatability. Those who refused to try grasshoppers showed boomerang effect; they convinced themselves that grasshoppers were even more disgusting than they had thought initially. In addition, the more dissonance the subjects had about trying or not trying the grasshoppers, the more they justified their behavior. Those who ate grasshoppers in response to the obnoxious commander's plea had great dissonance. As was expected, those who helped the negative communicator were much more likely to attribute their eating to the fact that grasshoppers were "not too bad," than were those who had helped the attractive communicator. On the other hand, of the men who refused to eat the grasshoppers, those who had refused to do a favor for a "good guy" had more need to justify their refusal than did men who refused to help the obnoxious commander. And, as dissonance theory predicted, the former group of men were more likely to exaggerate the repulsiveness of the grasshoppers than were the latter group.

When one has a totally effective message, one may be better off having it delivered by a communicator who is *not* extremely attractive. Then, should individuals subsequently question their own motives in accepting such a message, they will *not* be tempted to attribute their conversion to "the smooth-talking charm" of the communicator. It will be obvious to them that, if anything, the unattractive communicator must have been a liability.

Ambivalent Emotions

In virtually all texts, attraction is considered to be a unidimensional variable. It is assumed that attraction and hostility are mirror images of one another, and that the more we dislike someone, the

less we like him. In most cases, such a conception of liking seems to accurately reflect reality. There is a good possibility, however, that in a few associations, attraction and hostility may be relatively independent: one might feel both extreme attraction and extreme hostility toward the same individual. Such mixtures of feelings probably exist more commonly in intimate relationships. For example, we may love *and* hate our best friend more intensely than we could ever love or hate a brief acquaintance. La Rochefoucauld claims that the more one loves a mistress, the more one is ready to hate her.

When we discussed romantic love, we suggested that a mixture of emotions might be a common prelude and accompaniment to romantic love. Schachter's (1964) research suggested all that was necessary to produce "love" was strong physiological arousal accompanied by the cognitive label "love." The physiological arousal so necessary to a romantic experience could presumably come from a wide variety of sources. Anxiety, anger, desperation, loneliness, and sexual arousal may all be potential sources of emotional arousal, which under the right circumstances, one might label as love.

If, in intimate relationships, liking and hostility do tend to go hand in hand, one's feelings for his loved ones might be expected to fluctuate dramatically. Generally, he would feel great love for his friend. When they argued, however, he might hate his friend more intensely than he could ever hate a stranger. Depending on the state of their friendship, then, the friend's communication effectiveness should alter. In choosing a communicator then, we are probably better off choosing a person that the listener holds in constant high regard, rather than choosing his loved ones, whom he may find to be extremely attractive—at times.

In summary, we have been able to discern two exceptions to the general principle that the more attractive a communicator is, the more effective he will be: (1) When one has a *completely effective* message, he should utilize a neutral or negative communicator. (2) One should avoid choosing a communicator who is *generally* attractive, but who, on rare occasions, is capable of arousing violent hatred or jealousy.

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